Term length and political performance / (Record no. 79794)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02027cam a22003254a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field GrThPMO
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240517014840.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 090217s2008 maua b 000 0 eng d
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number hzn113990
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency GrThPMO
Transcribing agency GrThPMO
043 ## - GEOGRAPHIC AREA CODE
Geographic area code s-ag---
049 ## - LOCAL HOLDINGS (OCLC)
-- BIB
050 14 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB1
Item number .N38 no. 14511
099 ## - LOCAL FREE-TEXT CALL NUMBER (OCLC)
Classification number HB1.N38 no. 14511
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Dal Bó, Ernesto
9 (RLIN) 85829
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Term length and political performance /
Statement of responsibility, etc. Ernesto Dal Bó, Martín Rossi.
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge, Mass. :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. National Bureau of Economic Research,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2008.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent [10], 49 p. :
Other physical details ill. ;
Dimensions 22 cm.
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement NBER working paper series ;
Volume/sequential designation no. 14511.
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-25).
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. We evaluate the effects of the duration of legislative terms on the performance of legislators. We exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives where term lengths were assigned randomly. Results for various objective measures of legislative output show that longer terms enhance legislative performance. We use a second experiment in the Argentine Senate to determine whether our results are specific to a particular chamber and a particular time. The results from the Senate reinforce the idea that longer terms enhance legislative productivity. Our results highlight limits to classic theories of electoral discipline (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986) predicting that shorter terms, by tightening accountability, will incentivize hard work by politicians. We discuss and test possible explanations. Our results suggest that the "accountability logic" is overcome by an "investment logic."
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
9 (RLIN) 182864
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Legislators
General subdivision Term of office
Geographic subdivision Argentina.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
9 (RLIN) 182865
Topical term or geographic name as entry element Politics, Practical
Geographic subdivision Argentina.
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Rossi, Martín A.
9 (RLIN) 85830
710 2# - ADDED ENTRY--CORPORATE NAME
Corporate name or jurisdiction name as entry element National Bureau of Economic Research
9 (RLIN) 822
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
Volume number/sequential designation no. 14511.
9 (RLIN) 3825
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w14511">http://www.nber.org/papers/w14511</a>
942 00 - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha issues (borrowed), all copies 0
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Collection code Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Cost, normal purchase price Full call number Barcode Date last seen Copy number Cost, replacement price Price effective from Koha item type
          Research Papers University of Macedonia Library University of Macedonia Library Βιβλιοστάσιο Β (Stack Room B) 17/02/2009 0.00 HB1.N38 no. 14511 0013119129 17/03/2009 1 26.00 10/11/2015 Book
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