Currency misalignments and optimal monetary policy : a reexamination / Charles Engel.
Material type:
TextSeries: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. 14829.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009Description: 33, 12 p. : ill. ; 22 cmSubject(s): Monetary policy -- Econometric modelsLOC classification: HB1 | .N38 no. 14829Online resources: Click here to access online Summary: This paper examines optimal monetary policy in an open-economy two-country model with sticky prices. We show that currency misalignments are inefficient and lower world welfare. We find that optimal policy must target not only inflation and the output gap, but also the currency misalignment. However the interest rate reaction function that supports this targeting rule may involve only the CPI inflation rate. This result illustrates how examination of "instrument rules" may hide important trade-offs facing policymakers that are incorporated in "targeting rules". The model is a modified version of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler's (JME, 2002). The key change is that we allow pricing to market or local-currency pricing and consider the policy implications of currency misalignments. Besides highlighting the importance of the currency misalignment, our model also gives a rationale for targeting CPI, rather than PPI, inflation.
| Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Book
|
University of Macedonia Library Βιβλιοστάσιο Β (Stack Room B) | Research Papers | HB1.N38 no. 14829 (Browse shelf (Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 0013125744 |
Includes bibliographical references.
This paper examines optimal monetary policy in an open-economy two-country model with sticky prices. We show that currency misalignments are inefficient and lower world welfare. We find that optimal policy must target not only inflation and the output gap, but also the currency misalignment. However the interest rate reaction function that supports this targeting rule may involve only the CPI inflation rate. This result illustrates how examination of "instrument rules" may hide important trade-offs facing policymakers that are incorporated in "targeting rules". The model is a modified version of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler's (JME, 2002). The key change is that we allow pricing to market or local-currency pricing and consider the policy implications of currency misalignments. Besides highlighting the importance of the currency misalignment, our model also gives a rationale for targeting CPI, rather than PPI, inflation.
There are no comments on this title.