Media versus special interests / Alexander Dyck, David Moss, Luigi Zingales.
Material type:
TextSeries: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. 14360.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008Description: 47 p. : ill. ; 22 cmSubject(s): Mass media -- Political aspects -- History -- 20th century | Pressure groupsLOC classification: HB1 | .N38 no. 14360Online resources: Click here to access online Summary: We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests.
| Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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University of Macedonia Library Βιβλιοστάσιο Β (Stack Room B) | Research Papers | HB1.N38 no. 14360 (Browse shelf (Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 0013119306 |
Includes bibliographical references (p. 44-47).
We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests.
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