Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply : an experimental investigation / Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, M. Utku Ünver.

By: Niederle, MurielContributor(s): Roth, Alvin E, 1951- | National Bureau of Economic Research | Ünver, M. UtkuMaterial type: TextTextSeries: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. 15006.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009Description: 46 p. : ill. ; 22 cmSubject(s): Labor market -- Econometric models | Supply and demandLOC classification: HB1 | .N38 no. 15006Online resources: Click here to access online Summary: Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.
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Research Papers HB1.N38 no. 15006 (Browse shelf (Opens below)) 1 Available 0013125501

Includes bibliographical references.

Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

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