000 01745cam a22003254a 4500
001 81190
003 GrThPMO
005 20240613014638.0
008 090825s2009 mau b 000 0 eng d
035 _ahzn115616
040 _aGrThPMO
_cGrThPMO
043 _af-rh---
049 _bBIB
050 1 4 _aHB1
_b.N38 no. 14799
099 _aHB1.N38 no. 14799
100 1 _aRobinson, James A.,
_d1960-
_964510
245 1 4 _aThe real swing voter's curse /
_cJames A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik.
260 _aCambridge, Mass. :
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research,
_c2009.
300 _a10 p. ;
_c22 cm.
490 1 _aNBER working paper series ;
_vno. 14799.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 _aA key idea in political economy is that policy is often tailored to voters who are not ideologically attached - swing voters. We show, however, that in political environments where political parties can use repression and violence to exclude voters from elections, they may optimally target the swing voters. This is because they anticipate that if they had to compete for the support of these voters, they would end up giving them a lot of policy favors. Hence in weakly institutionalized political environments swing voters are cursed rather than blessed. We illustrate the analysis with a discussion of recent political events in Zimbabwe.
650 0 _9183764
_aPolitical violence
_xEconometric models.
651 0 _9108099
_aZimbabwe
_xPolitics and government
_y1980-
700 1 _9134019
_aTorvik, Ragnar.
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research
_9822
830 0 _aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;
_vno. 14799.
_93825
856 4 0 _uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w14799
942 0 0 _00
999 _d81190