Term length and political performance / Ernesto Dal Bó, Martín Rossi.
Material type:
TextSeries: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. 14511.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008Description: [10], 49 p. : ill. ; 22 cmSubject(s): Legislators -- Term of office -- Argentina | Politics, Practical -- ArgentinaLOC classification: HB1 | .N38 no. 14511Online resources: Click here to access online Summary: We evaluate the effects of the duration of legislative terms on the performance of legislators. We exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives where term lengths were assigned randomly. Results for various objective measures of legislative output show that longer terms enhance legislative performance. We use a second experiment in the Argentine Senate to determine whether our results are specific to a particular chamber and a particular time. The results from the Senate reinforce the idea that longer terms enhance legislative productivity. Our results highlight limits to classic theories of electoral discipline (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986) predicting that shorter terms, by tightening accountability, will incentivize hard work by politicians. We discuss and test possible explanations. Our results suggest that the "accountability logic" is overcome by an "investment logic."
| Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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University of Macedonia Library Βιβλιοστάσιο Β (Stack Room B) | Research Papers | HB1.N38 no. 14511 (Browse shelf (Opens below)) | 1 | Available | 0013119129 |
Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-25).
We evaluate the effects of the duration of legislative terms on the performance of legislators. We exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives where term lengths were assigned randomly. Results for various objective measures of legislative output show that longer terms enhance legislative performance. We use a second experiment in the Argentine Senate to determine whether our results are specific to a particular chamber and a particular time. The results from the Senate reinforce the idea that longer terms enhance legislative productivity. Our results highlight limits to classic theories of electoral discipline (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986) predicting that shorter terms, by tightening accountability, will incentivize hard work by politicians. We discuss and test possible explanations. Our results suggest that the "accountability logic" is overcome by an "investment logic."
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